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It is clear that some approximation of Morgan's idea of a progression of
social, technological, cultural, and political changes has become the common
view of those educated in Western traditions. Upon this has been grafted a
somewhat more sharply delineated picture of a stone, a pottery, a metal
(copper, then iron) age of technological evolution, progressing from
hundng-gathering to agriculture to manufacture. This picture is meant to
serve as both historical outline and theory. We are still caught up in that
generalized fiction of "progress."
Nevertheless it behooves all educated persons to own such books, so
that—if nothing else—they have a basis to compare facts as modern
discoveries are made and offer a better view of reality. Hopefully, in time,
some more compelling theory than a progression of states (Comte) or a
dialectic turning of history on its head (Marx) may arise to account for man.
A. S. Iberall

COMMAND VS. MARKET IN CIVILIZATIONAL

HISTORY

William H. McNeill, The Pursuit of Power: Technology, Armed Force and Society
since A.D. 1000. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982).
This book by a noted historian provides some material and a viewpoint
that may be of some use to civilizationists, as well as to peace researchers,
educators, and activists. T h e book focuses on the period since 1000 AD, but
an introductory chapter provides some background on arms and society in
antiquity since 3500 BC, at which time bronze weapons and armor came into
being at or near the beginning of civilization in the Middle East. At this time,
and throughout most of the time until and including the present day, wars
were fought by what the author calls "command economies," that is,
economies responding to governmental needs rather than the needs of the
marketplace. In the beginning of civilization these "commands" took the
form of pillage and plunder as early civilized governments provided for the
needs of their armies by authorizing the armies to take what they needed
from the "citizenry" along the way. This "command" procedure apparently
worked well enough for several thousand years, but military progress was
slow. Weapons and armor were not much better than those used by
primitive peoples, except that they were made of metal instead of sticks and
stones. T h e nobles and royalty rode to battle in chariots, but as often as not
they dismounted from their awkward chariots before fighting, because the
chariots only got in the way. New and improved chariots appeared sometime
after 1800 BC, but this did not help the so-called "civilized" (city-dwelling)
peoples as much as it helped their "barbarian" (agricultural) neighbors, who
had better access to horses, which enabled them to raid their Middle Eastern
civilized neighbors.
Barbarian successes led Egypt to hire some of them as a permanent army
in the 16th century BC, which served to defend the New Kingdom very
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effectively for several generations. This was the first known permanent
army in human history. Before this time military activities were relatively
unorganized encounters between towns or villages, or between them and the
barbarians. Iron replaced bronze about 1400 BC in the Middle East, but this
was not widely spread until 1200 BC, which only strengthened the
barbarians more and which put an end to chariots. From 1200 to 1000 BC,
the barbarians introduced a measure of equality wherever they conquered,
since barbarians (farmers and herders) were organized along more
egalitarian lines than civilized peoples were, even as savages (gatherers and
hunters) were organized along more egalitarian lines than barbarians were.
However, the barbarians were soon co-opted by the civilizations which they
conquered, so that they soon became as bureaucratic as civilized peoples, if
not more so.
T h e Assyrians were most successful in improving on the bureaucratic
management of their armies in the early iron age, peaking from about 900 to
600 BC, and in replacing chariots with cavalry. That is, they simply did away
with the chariots, hut kept the horses. However, they were still commanding
the economy by plunder and pillage, until the equalitarian horsemen of the
steppes destroyed the Assyrian empire about 600 BC. Nomadic equality
conquered civilized peoples not only in the Middle East, but in the Far East as
well. And this pattern of nomadic conquest of civilized lands continued from
time to time almost u p to modern times.
But, a big change came about in command economies about 600 BC when
the Medes and the Persians somehow hit upon the bright idea of charging
their subjects rents and taxes instead of plundering and pillaging them in
order to support their armies. And this bright idea was soon picked u p and
institutionalized in China, India, and even in the Mediterranean area with
the rise of Rome! This was a remarkable step forward, which gave
civilizations an edge on the barbarians, although it did not stop the
barbarians entirely from trying to spread their egalitarian ways around the
world. But this new method of commanding economies made subjects
somewhat more loyal and amenable to being commanded than had plunder
and pillage. As a result, civilizations, empires, and wars took a giant step
forward. They passed "Go" on the game board of civilization, empire, and
war. They amassed more territory than they could handle. Alexander came
along and annexed the Persian empire, but Caesar soon followed and
annexed the Macedonian empires.
Throughout these ancient and classical times, there was always some
market behavior and private entrepreneurs, but this kind of behavior was
generally frowned upon in civilized societies, and remained secondary and
subordinate until about 1000 AD, halfway through the Middle Ages. T h e n
the commercialization and industrialization of war came into play much
more than previously, slowly at first, but then at a runaway speed in modern
Europe.
First, the Chinese toyed with this idea for several hundred years, but it
seemed immoral from the Confucian point of view. T h e Chinese had the
wherewithal to conquer the world, or at least to give it a good try. They had
the crossbow since Han times. They had gunpowder since about 1000 AD,
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and guns by 1300 AD. They had a million soldiers under government hire.
But, presumably because of their Confucian ethics, they renounced their
industrial revolution and overseas empire in the 15th century. The same
thing seemed to happen in the Far East generally, including South Asia,
which was presumably influenced by its Hindu and Buddhist ethic.
But not so Europe, whose religion had little or no trouble accommodating
itself to industrial revolutions and overseas empires. However, never let it be
said that the Christians had no scruples, because they certainly did. When
the manufacture of the crossbow expanded in the 12th century, the 2nd
Lateran Council permitted its use against infidels, but banned its use among
Christians. For the most part, however, private enterprise prevailed over
governmental commands during this period. This resulted in bigger and
better crossbows, which led to superior armor to withstand the arrows. Steel
was used instead of wood. Private entrepreneurs experimented with bigger
and better guns. Knights (the cavalry) gave way to the infantry in the 16th
century. T h e armies were generally mercenary and as free-wheeling as the
arms manufacturers, leading to foreign and overseas adventures which
increased the size of European empires beyond that of most of the empires
that had preceded them.
Private enterprise gave a boost to civilizations, empires, and wars so that
Western Europe (because even Eastern Europe with its more orthdox form
of Christianity did not keep up with the West) kept on improving its
weapons, its arts, its sciences, its literature, etc. etc., until it became the most
civilized, imperial, and warlike place on the earth, dominating and
exploiting the Americas, Asia, and Afria. What made this effort so much
more successful than the ancient, classical and early medieval command
economies was the tremendous advances made by private enterprise when it
was freed from the ethical constraints which held back the rest of the world:
"As long as European overseas enterprises were managed in this fashion,
armed force on the seas was made to pay for itself by a relatively close
conformity to the dictates of the capital market.. . As European ships
gradually became more numerous, their capacity to affect Asian economic
and political life increased until, eventually, even the greatest land empires
of Asia were unable to resist European power. This extraordinary shift took
three centuries to reach its climax. . . But until the 19th century, sea trade
and privateering remained intimately connected" (p. 104).
When Europeans fought one another, this seldom paid because they were
too evenly matched. But, Siberian furs paid Russia to war in Siberia;
American silver paid the Spanish to war in America; the Asian coasdine paid
Portugal, and later the English and the Dutch, etc. These imperial wars were
pushovers, since the less civilized countries could not begin to match
European hardware, thanks to European "know-how" developed by private
entrepreneurs in competition with one another. While command economies
were characterized by private profit being subordinated to public welfare,
market economies were characterized by the invisible hand of private profit
ruling over all: "their reluctant readiness to tolerate private pursuit of profit
allowed western Europeans to dominate the rest of the earth" (p. 116). T h e
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rise of the West was an illustration par excellence of how to gain a whole
world by simply losing your soul. Western civilization has not been called
"Faustian" for nothing: we sold our soul to the devil in order to rule the
world.
T h e author, however, found this market economy to be "an eccentric
departure from the human norm of command behavior—the sort of
behavior that dominated ancient times and has reasserted itself with
remarkable power since the 1880s" (p. 116). "The result was systematic
expansion . . . at the expense of other peoples and polities of the earth . . .
technological and organizational innovation continued, allowing Europeans
to outstrip other peoples of the earth more and more emphatically until the
globe-girdling imperialism of the 19th century became as cheap and easy for
Europeans as it was catastrophic to Asians, Africans, and the peoples of
Oceania" (p. 143).
This imperial process was helped along by the democratic revolution in
France and the industrial revolution in England at the turn of the 19th
century. T h e democratic revolution brought everyone into the act. Everyone
was in the army now. T h e age of totalitarianism was ushered in under the
name of democracy, long before totalitarianism was perfected in the 20th
century. This beat the old Persian rents and taxes all hollow as a method of
generating loyalty and obedience. And the industrial revolution made
industry a part of the military 150 years before President Eisenhower's
speech writers hit upon the happy phrase "military-industrial complex,"
somewhat belatedly. Civilization advanced apace, empires grew bigger, and
so did wars, except imperial wars, of course, which remained pushovers and
which involved little expense. T h e Napoleonic wars helped the industrial
revolution which, in turn, helped democracy. France and Great Britain
raised their wealth and power to new heights, while eastern Europe,
including Russia, lagged behind.
By the latter part of the 19th century, armies were counted by the million;
railroads and steamships came into play; guns became more powerful, and
ships became more armored to ward them off. Mass production joined the
army after the Crimean War. T h e US Civil War was the first full-fledged
industrialized war, with its machine-made arms and its railroad supply. T h e
Prussians added the telegraph to the railroad. Imperial expansion became
cheaper and easier, and everyone got into the act. Even the "diseases of
civilization attacked the native populations of such places as Australia, South
Africa, North and South America. . . It consequently became possible to
settle and develop these half-emptied lands without using any but the most
trifling military force" (p. 260).
As the 19th century drew to a close, something new began to happen. T h e
private enterprisers began to run out of steam. Their military expenditures
were exceeding their economic incomes, so the governments had to step in
to b r i d g e this g a p with no-risk assurance to the private military
entrepreneurs. This led to another giant step forward. Pass "Go" with a
vengeance. Experiment at public expense. T h e public takes the chances and
the losses, while the capitalist keeps the profits. Now, this is surely capitalist
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heaven! Not to mention militarist heaven, and nationalist heaven, and who
knows how many other kinds and numbers of heaven?
In any event, this new kind of command economy is my interpretation of
McNeill's historical data. McNeill himself did not interpret this as anything
new, but merely a return to the ancient norm where governmental
command ruled over the free market. World War I introduced the old
command economies to the 20th century; World War II intensified
commands over markets; and the arms races, nuclear weapons, space
launches, atomic explosions, and military expenditures since 1945 have all
brought command economies to new heights (or depths, depending on your
point of view or value system). According to the author, the subordination of
the market to command in the 20th century has made world government
not only necessary but feasible: "when and whether a transition will be made
from a system of states to an empire of the earth is the gravest question
humanity confronts" (p. 384). This is the only way to bring to an end the
"millennium of upheaval" (p. 386) from 1000 to 2000 AD, which disrupted
the civilized norm of command over the market.
McNeill's analysis is brilliant, and the breadth and depth of his historical
vision is breathtaking. But I respectfully disagree with his conclusion to the
effect that command has superseded the market in the 20th century (starting
in the late 19th century). My own conclusion from his data and analyses is
that the marketeers have conned us again. As long as they could make war
pay, they were happy to bear the costs in return for the freedom of charging
whatever the traffic could bear. Governments were always in their pockets,
but when military expenditures exceeded economic profits, the Danish,
Dutch, English, and French East India Companies soon got their respective
governments to foot the military bills, which enabled them to continue their
exploitation of the East Indies under the guise of governments instead of
companies. And this transformation happened well before the end of the
19th century. But, as the author was always careful to emphasize, these
things always happen gradually. History, almost by definition, is a gradual
process of social evolution. Beginning and ending dates are arbitrary
assignments to outstanding events which had their precedents, however
dimly perceivable these sometimes were. In any event, the old command was
not so old, after all. It was something new which, rather than bring the
market under some kind of social control, fooled the command structure
into thinking that it was in control when, in fact, the market was running
roughshod over the power structure, using the public to pay the bills and to
suffer the losses, while the market collected the profits.
McNeill's own data can be used against his interpretation of them. If the
"millennium of upheaval" is a function of the free market, why did not this
"upheaval" settle down after the private market came under public control in
the late 19th century. This should have resulted in less devastating wars in
the 20th century, more like those that occurred prior to 1000 AD. But that is
not what happened. On the contrary, military devastation hit new heights
never before achieved, suggesting that the market was more in control than
ever, in spite of appearances to the contrary. T h e market had simply
co-opted command to pay the bills and take the losses which, after all, is a
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very sensible and rational thing for marketeers to do. Why take chances if
you don't have to? Why not take the profit and leave the debts to others as
long as you can get away with it? "Nice work if you can get it," according to
the words of a popular song in the late 20th century, "and you can get it if you
try." T h e history of the 20th century would suggest that you can get it
without even trying, and this concept is also expressed by the title of a very
popular play and movie in the late 20th century.
T h e reader of this review is advised to read the book itself, which is a
pleasure to read and full of fascinating historical facts and insights, many of
which could not be included in this brief review. T h e reader might very well
come to a conclusion different from those of the author and this reviewer.
That's what history does best: challenge the human imagination! It is almost,
if not quite, like an ink blot, into which we can read our heart's desires.
Everyone should give it a try. Why let some of us determine what the rest of
us will think?
William Eckhardt

"SOCIAL SPECTROSCOPY"

AND ".LONG CYCLES"

George Modelski, ed., Exploring Long Cycles (Boulder: Lynne Rienner
Publishers, 1987).
T h e first paper in this volume is by two of our members, Arthur Iberall
and David Wilkinson, "Dynamic Foundations for Complex Systems," and
needs to be considered separately from the others. It is mostly an attempt to
apply the laws of thermodynamics to civilizational processes. Its major
presentation is of a set of "spectroscopic" time scales, that is, proposed time
scales on which various human activities occur, and these are useful and
interesting ans general background knowledge. T h e smallest is one-tenth of
a second, and is the approximate reaction time that people have to outside
events, e.g. to the change of a traffic light while driving. T h e next eight range
from one second to 30-90 days in length and are also part of individual
human activity. Various others are longer, but only one, "200-1200 years," is
of specific application to problems of civilizational development, and since
this ranges over a whole order of magnitude its predicting power is limited.
T h e major weakness of this section is that in civilizational (as against
human-biological) terms it is almost entirely hypothetical; there is only one
single application to anything approaching a specific civilizational problem.
Even this single application is questionable. It concerns activity on the time
scale of 3-4 years (p. 31):
For instance, Grant (1985) discusses ninety-two Roman emperors and mentions
nearly one hundred others over the periodfrom 31 B.C. to 476 A.D., implying, as one
of many such illustrations, an average period ofpolitical rule of about two and one-half
to five years. This short average tenure suggests an implicit, underlying binary yearly
evaluation process with memory and involving weak decision making: Did our leader
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